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Introduction
In identity-based systems, each entity i has his(her) own identity number ID,, and a trusted center needs to generate a pair of a public information P (known to d entities) and a secret information S (known to only the trusted center), and a pair of public-key PK, and secret-key SK, for entity i. Lek a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm CKG be a center-key generator that, on input lk, outputs a pair of the public information P (IF'! = O(k') for same constant c > 0) and the secret information S (IS1 = O(kd) for some constant d > 0), i.e., C K G ( l k ) = (P, S ) , and let a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm E K G be a entity-key generator that, on input lk, P, S, and ID,, outputs a pair of public-key PK, and secret-key SK, for entity i, i.e., EKG ((lk, P, S , I D , ) ) = (Ph ',, SK,) . Note that k is the security parameter.
When a foolish entity j carelessly loses his secret-key SK, or reveals it and asks the trusted center again to generate a new pair of public-key PK; and secret-key SK; for him, what should the trusted center do? If the system is provably secure (see, e.g., [FS] , [FFS] , [GQ] , [OO] .), i.e., there exist no efficient algorithms for entity j to derive the secret information S from P, ID,, and a single pair of (PK,, SK,) , then (presumably) the simplest and secure way to update the secret-key SK, to SK: is to make the trusted center run CKG on input l k in order to regenerate a new pair of public information I" and secret information S' and to make the trusted center regenerate a new pair of publickey PK; and secret-key SK; for the entity j by running EKG on input l k , P, s', and IDJ (or SK,) . This scheme, however, imposes cumbersome procedures on the trusted center and all entities, because the trusted center must regenerate not only a new pair of public-key PK; and secret-key SK; for the foolish entity j but a new pair of public-key PK: and secret-key SK: for every entity i (f j).
Another way to update the secret-key SK, to SK; is to make the trusted center run only EICG on input l k , P , S, and ID, (or SK,) and to regenerate a new pair of public-key PK; and secret-key Sh;' only for the foolish entity j, while those for the other entities i (# j ) are unchanged. This scheme is much simpler than before, but unfortunately there might be a possibility that the entity j can derive the secret information S efficiently from P, ID,, PK,, SK,, PK: , and SK;.
Thus this provokes us t o construct efficient and provably secure key-updating schemes in identity-based systems in the above sense. To do this, we take the extended FiatShamir scheme [GQ] , [OO] as an identity-based system, and apply two kinds of keyupdating schemes, one is sequential and the other is parallel, to the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme. (The details w i l l be discussed in Section 2.) We also show that our key-updating schemes are provably secure against polynomially many times key-updating even if any polynomially many entities conspire to find a secret-key of any other entities.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a brief description of keygeneration and key-distribution in the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme [GQ] , [OO] , and proposes two kinds of key-updating schemes, sequential one and parallel one; Section 3 shows that both schemes are equivalent to each other in a polynomial time sense, i.e., there exists a polynomial time algorithm that transforms the sequential key-updating scheme to the parallel one, and vise versa; Section 4 gives a main result that both keyupdating schemes are provably secure against polynomially many times key-updating, i.e., any polynomially many conspiring entities can not find a secret-key of any other entities under the assumption that decrypting RSA is hard; and Section 5 finally gives conclusion and remarks, and refers to extensions of our results to more general settings and the security of the schemes against conspiracy of entities.
2 Key-Updating Schemes
Extended Fiat-Shamir Scheme
This subsection presents a brief description of key-generation and key-distribution in the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme [GQ] , [OO] . The extended Fiat-Shamir scheme is an extension of the Fiat-Shamir scheme [FS] , [FFS] , and is shown, under the assumption that factoring is hard, t o be zereknowledge in the sequential execution (of the protocol) and to be non-transferable in the parallel execution (of the protocol). This scheme is an identity-based system, and thus the trusted center needs to generate a pair of public information P (known to all entities) and secret information S (known to only trusted center) and to distribute a pair of public-key PK, and secret-key SK; for each entity i with his identity number ID;, in the following way:
The trusted center has two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, i.e., center-key generator CKG and entity-key generator EKG; On input Ik, the center-key generator CXG outputs a pair of public information n (= p -q) and secret information (p, q) , where ply E OF' and IpI = lyl = k, and on input lk, n, ( p , q ) , and ID,, the entity-key generator EKG outputs a pair of public-key e; and secret-key S; for entity i such that xi IDi (mod n). Note that OF denotes a set of odd primes and la1 denotes the length of binary encoding of a. For details of identification and signature protocols in the extended FiatShamir scheme, see [GQ] , [OO] .
Key-Updating Schemes
In this subsection, we propose two kinds of key-updating schemes, sequential one [FT] and parallel one, in the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme. Consider the case where some entity i asks the trusted center to issue a new pair of public-key e: and secret-key S: for the entity i in some reason, e.g., losing or revealing his original secret-key S,.
Informally, our key-updating schemes are as follows: (1) Sequential Key-Updating Scheme (SKU) is a key-updating scheme iu which the trusted center runs the entity-key generator EKG on input lk, n, ( p , q ) , el, and S, (instead of ID,), and generates a new pair of (e:,S:) such that S : ' S, (mod n) and e, # e: , and (2) Parallel Key-Updating Scheme (PKU) is a key-updating scheme in which the trusted center runs the entity-key generator E K G on input lk, n, (p, q ) , el, and ID,, and generates a new pair of (e:, S:)
ID, (mod n ) and e, # e:. Note that for entity i, a pair of public-key and secret-key will be (e,e:, S:) in SKU, while will be (e:, S:) in PKU. This formulation, however, does not necessarily match our desire, because a malicious entity j might ask the trusted center to issue new pairs of (e; , Sl) many times for compromising the secret information (p, q). Then we formally define our key-updating schemes in more general settings.
Let V(ln1) be any fixed polynomial in Inl, and let OP(t) denote a set of odd primes less than t. Here we assume that each entity i is allowed to ask the trusted center to issue new pairs of (e:,S:) at must U(ln1) times.
Sequential Key-Updating Scheme (SKU):
Initial Key-Setting Stage:
distributes a pair of his public-key elo) and his secret-key go' such that ID, (mod n), where er) E OP( Lfi/4]), $'$ID, (mod n), and ID:$l (mod n).
Key-Updating Stage:
the trusted center distributes a new pair of (e~rl)l$r')) such that $'-'I = (mod n), where e!r') E oP( LJ; ; I 4J), e!J) # e r * ) (0 5 j < r,), grD)$1D, (mod n), and $)+grJ (mod n) (0 5 j < r,).
Remark 2.1: In the r,-th key-updating of SKU, a pair of the public-key and the secret-key will be (e?)e!'). . . e!"), gr*)). The condition *'$ID, (mod n) (0 5 j 5 1;)
shows that the trusted center avoids distributing trivial secret-key $), and the condition @)$gr*) (mod n) (0 5 j < r,) implies that the trusted center does not distribute the same secret-key gr') again, because old secret-keys might be known to someone else. The trusted center does not care about collisions of secret-keys among entities. 
trusted center distributes a new pair of (dr'),Tjr')) such that ID; = (T('i)} (mod n) (0 5 j < r,), and ID, Remark 2.2: In the r;-th key-updating of PKU, a pair of the public-key and the secret-key will be er')). The meaning of conditions *'$ID; (mod n) (0 5 j 5 ri)
and T(')fZ$ri) (mod n) (0 _< j < r;) is similar to the one in the Remark 2.1. The trusted center does not care about collisions of secret-keys among entities. fy')
$ID, (mod n) (0 5 j < r;).
Transforms Between SKU and PKU
This section shows that key-updating schemes SKU and PKU are equivalent to each other in a polynomial time sense, i.e., there exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that transforms SKU to PKU, and vice versa.
Let sck denote a set of strong composites with the security parameter k, i.e., sck = {n I fz = p . q, P # 9, = 141 = p = 2 p ' + 1 , q = 2 q f + 1 , p,q,pl,q'EOP}.
To prove that for n E s c k , key-updating schemes SKU and PKU are deterministic polynomial time transformable to each other, we need to show the following lemmas:
gcd(e, A(n)) = 1, where A(n) is the Carmichael function [Kr] of n.
Proof:
Let n E sck. Then for any odd e less than [&/4J, e < min{#,q') and
From the definition of sck, it follows that
Note that n E SCk, i.e., lpl = 191 = k , then 2 . min{p,q} > max{p, q}. Hence,
and thus e < min{p',p'}. It immediately follows, from the fact that X(n) = 2p'q', that gcd(e, A( . ) ) = gcd(e, 2p'q') = 1, because e < min{p', q'}, e is odd, and p', q' E OP. 0 Lemma 3.2:
numbers ul and a2, zO'-"'fl (mod n), where alra2 < LJrr/4J.
Let n E SCh, and z E 2; such that s 2 f l (mod n). For any distinct odd
Proof: By Contradiction. Without loss of generality, we mume that a1 < a2. Assume that z"'-O1 z 1 (mod n). This implies that the order of 2 modulo n divides both A(n) and a2 -u1. Since n E S C k , X(n) = 2p'q' and 0 < a2 -al <min{p', q'} (see Lemma 3.1.), and thus the order of z modulo n is equal to either 1 or 2. This, however, contradicts the assumption that z 2 f l (mod n). Hence z"'-''1$1 (mod n). 0 Let r be any positive integer and let n E SCk. Let ID E Z;, 9') E 2; 
Since n E SCI, and ID (E 2;) satisfies I P f l (mod n), it follows, from Lemma ID fi') (mod n)
IDf" f (T't)) (mod n)
ID''" f ID (mod n)
On the other hand, for any i , j (0 5 i < j 5 r), we also have
hence I D f f l i ) (mod n) (0 5 i 5 r) and T(')fT'(j) ( ID" Q--e(J) f I D (mod n) (0 < i < j 5 r), in the r-th key-updating of SKU (see Lemma 3.3.), where n E SCk, I D E Z:, S") = (S''), s"), . . . , Sf')), and e(?) = (e(O), e(l), . . . , dr)). In a way similar to the above, we define CPKU to be a set of tuples (n, ID, T"), f")) that satisfy (mod n) (0 5 i 5 r);
in the r-th key-updating of PKU (see Lemma 3.4.), where n E SCk, ID E Z:, $" = (@'I, T"), . . . , fir)), and f") = (f(O), f"), . . . , f")).
We use ASKU+PKIJ to denote any algorithm that, on input (n, ID, S(r), e(r)) E CSKU, outputs (n, ID, T'", f'") f CPKU, and APKU-SKU to denote any algorithm that, on input (n,ID, *'I, f'") E CPKU, outputs (n, ID, dr), ecr)) E CSKU. Then we have the following theorems on deterministic polynomial time transformabdity between S K U and PKU.
Theorem 3.5:
There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A S K U~P K U . 
Sketch of Proof: On input (n,ID,S(r),e(r)) E

Sketch of Proof:
Let n be an odd composite. We assume here that z1 is the al-th root of y modulo n, and 2 2 is the a r t h root of y modulo n, where gcd(a1,az) = 1 and y E 2;. Then we can compute z, the ala2-th root of y modulo n, by algorithm E (see below.) in deterministic polynomial time without knowing prime factors of n. On input n,y,zl,al,22, and a2, the algorithm E computes two integers s and t such that ta1+ sa2 = 1 by Euclidean algorithm, and outputs z 2 ; . z: (mod n). It is easy to see that the algorithm E runs in deterministic polynomial time and z is the alaz-th root of y modulo n. The algorithm APKU-SKU runs in the following way:
On input (n,ID,T(r),f(r)) E CPKU, the algorithm APKU-SKU sets T(') := go), f0) := do), and computes z; (1 5 i 5 r ) by running the deterministic polynomial time algorithm E on input (n, ID, S(I-'), e(O)e(l) --+ Ji-'),Pi), f")). Then the algorithm APKU+SKU substitutes z; to S(') and f(') to e(i) (1 5 i 5 r), and outputs (n, ID, S(r), e(r)), where S(') = (S(O), s") , . . . , S('1) and e(') = (e(O), e(l), . . . , e(r)).
time and (n, ID, S(r), e(r)) E C S K U . 0
It is not difficult to see that the algorithm APKU-SKU runs in deterministic polynomial
SKU and PKU are Provably Secure
This section shows that key-updating schemes SKU and PKU are provably secure against polynomially many times key-updating under the assumption that decrypting RSA is hard for n E SCk, i.e., even if any polynomially many entities conspire, they can not find a secret-key of any other entity in polynomidly many times key-updating.
To show this, we provide several lemmas in the following:
Let n E SCk and let U(1nl) be any fixed polynomial in 1 .1 . Let r be any positive integer not greater fban U(ln1) and Jet e(i) < [ 6 / 4 J (0 5 i <_ r -1) be distinct r odd primes. Then the probability P that for any d < 1 6 / 4 1 , d E OP( [fi/4J) and d # e(i) (0 5 i 5 r -1) is greater than C/ 1.1 for some C > O and sufficiently large n.
Proof:
number theorem [HW] , it follows that
denote the number of primes not greater than 2 (2 1 2). From prime 2 T ( Z ) > Colog2 2 ' for some constant Co. Then the probability P is thus P > C/ 1.1 for some constant C and sufficiently large n. 0
Lemma 4.2:
Let n E Sck and let U ( 1 .1 ) be any fixed polynomial in In!. Let f be any positive infeger not greater tban V(ln1) and let dr-l) = (e('), &),.. . , e(r-l)), where e ( i ) < [ 4 / 4 J (0 5 i 5 r -1) are distinct r odd primes. Define gcr) = (t?'), $1,. . . , ?('I) to be i$r) = (e('), e(l), . . . , e(r-l), d) for any d E OP( 1 6 / 4 1 ) such that d # e(i) (0 5 i 5 r -1).
Then for any g E 2; such that g2fl (mod n), gd17...d'' f g (mod n) (0 5 i < j 2 r ) iff gel'' -.e(') fg (mod n) (0 5 s < t 5 r -1) and (fli::
where L is the order of g modulo n.
Proof: Let L denote the order of g modulo n. Then it is clear that
for all s , t (0 5 s < t 5 r -l), and for all i , j (0 5 i < j <_ r ) . Thus it suffices to show that
Thus it is immediate to see that g"'i'..."J)fg (mod n ) (0 5 i < j < -f ) iff ge(c)-..e(') f g (mod n) (0 5 s < t 5 r -1) and ( n ; : ( 
O s i s r -I ) .
For n E S C k and e(') E U P ( Lfi/4J) (0 5 i 5 r -1 ) such that e(i) # e(3) (0 5 i < j 5 r -l ) , we define Dr+l to be a set of ( r
such that d , # e(t) (I 5 j 5 r + 1 , 0 5 i 5 r -1 ) .
Lemma 4.3:
Let n E sck and Jet V(ln1) be any fixed polynomial in 1 . 1 . Proof: Let L denot,e the order of g modulo n.
Since n E sck and g (E Z i ) satisfies g 2 f l (mod n ) , L 1 min{p', 9'). From Lemma 3.1, it follows that Lfi/4] 5 min{p', q'}, and
For simplicity, we assume that every entity i is numbered as 1,2, . . .. Let E(In1) and V(ln1) be any fixed polynomials in Inl. When rn (< E(In1) ) entit.ies, each of which is in the r,-th (1 5 r, 5 V(ln1)) key-updating, conspire to find a secret-key of any other entity u (> n), they can use the following information in SKU.
where Sr') = (go), $'I,. . . , gr')), e;") = (ef'), e!'), . . . , e!")) (1 5 i 5 m). Let R be m tuple of integers, R = (rl, r2,. . . , rm), and each r, (1 5 i 5 m) is not greater than V(ln1).
Then we use INV&'GR) to denote any algorithm that, on input outputs Y E Zt, such that z 3 ye (mod n) for a non-negligible fraction of z E 2:, and we use INV,'T$' to denote any algorithm that, on input outputs y E 2: such that z yf (mod TI) for a non-negligible fraction of z f Z:, where T = (e'),~:'), . . . ,erl)), fir" = (f:'),f:'),.. . , f:*J) (1 I i I m). In addition, we use I N V to denote any algorithm that, on input n E SCk, e E OF( Lfi/41), and z E 2:, outputs y E 2; such that z From technical reasons, we assume, throughout the rest of this paper, that each ID, such that I D 1 2 f l (mod n) is randomly chosen (by the trusted center) with uniform probability over Z:, but once assigned it is unchanged forever. I E Zz such that z 2 f l (mod n).
Set R := 4 and i := 1. Set S , := 4 and ! , = r, and choose SI(r') E 2: such that (.'$r')} $1 (mod n). [Ra] , [SS] .)
Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.
Step 4. For each d,$!S, (1 5 j 5 r, -I, + l), compute $"-') G [$'Dl}d' (mod n) until $'*-')&') (mod n) for all I ( I , 5 I 5 r,). Input.
n E S C k ; f E OP( Lfi/4]); z E 3: such that z a f l (mod n).
Run each
Step from 1 to 7 in the algorithm INV (INV$AR1) . Run the algorithm ASKU-PKU on input (n, ID,, S!r*), etra)) E CSKU for each i
(1 5 z 5 m), and output ( n , ID,, T!rl), ftra)) E C p~u .
Run the algorithm (oracle
z E 2; such that z 2 f l (mod n ) , and ( n , ID,, T!r'), f!r*)) (1 2 i Output. y E 2; such that z ZE yf (mod n).
m).
From t.he proof of Theorem 4.4, it follows that S t e p 1 runs in expected polynomial time. Since m < E(I.1) and Theorem 3.5 guarantees that the algorithm A~U -P K U runs in deterministic polynomial time, Step 2 runs in deterministic polynomial time.
Hence the algorithm I N V ( I N V $~G~' )
runs in expected polynomial time and out.puts y E 2; such that y zf (mod n ) for a non-negligible fraction of x E 2;. 0
Conclusion and Remarks
In this paper, we showed two kinds of secure key-updating schemes SKU and PKU in the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme. Here we define more general schemes SKU' and PKU':
Let n E SCk and let E(In1) and V(ln1) be any fixed polynomial in 1 .
.
Then the key-updating scheme SKU' is completely the same as SKU except that for each entity
i, e, < [fi/4J (0 5 j 5 rr 5 V(ln1)) is an odd number and is not necessarily distinct from each other, and the key-updating scheme PKU' is also completely the same as PKU except that for each entity i, f, (3) If, ( k ) (0 5 k < j 5 r t ) . Using a technique similar to the proofs of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, we can show that both SKU' and PKU' are provably secure if decrypting RSA is hard for n E SCk.
Observing the results in this paper, we can say that SKU and PKU have the same security with each other in a polynomial time sense, and seemingly so do SKU' and PKU'. The scheme PKU, however, seems to be better one than SKU in the light of efficiency, because in the r,-th ( 1 5 r, 5 V(ln1)) key-updating of PKU, a public-key of each entity i is only a prime f:"', while in the r,-th (1 <_ r, 5 U(ln1)) key-updating of SKU, a public-key of each entity i is n;;o ey). This is also the case for PKU' and SKU'.
Our results can be generalized to more theoretical form -For any transitive trapdoor random self-reducible uniform relation (see [IST] .), there exists a perfect zero-knowledge (identity-based) identificat,ion system with provably secure key-updating schemes, i.e., if any polynomially many entities conspire in polynomially many times key-updating, they
can not find a secret-key of a non-negligible fraction of (possible) other entities, or they can not misrepresent themselves for a non-negligible fraction of (possible) other entities.
